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The regulation of medical practice can historically be understood as a second-level agency relationship whereby
the state delegated authority to professional bodies to police the primary agency relationship between the
individual physician and the patient. Borow, Levi and Glekin show how different national systems vary in the
degree to which they insist on institutionally insulating the agency function from the promotion of private
professional interests, and relate these variations to different models of the health care state. In fact these
differences have even deeper roots in different “liberal” or “coordinated” varieties of capitalist political economies.
Neither model is inherently more efficient than the other: what matters is the internal coherence or logic of these
systems that conditions the expectations of actors in responding to particular challenges. The territory that Borow,
Levi and Glekin have usefully mapped invites further exploration in this regard.
This is a commentary on http://www.ijhpr.org/content/2/1/8.At the heart of the political economy of health care lies an
agency relationship between the physician and the patient,
whereby patients effectively delegate decisionmaking au-
thority regarding diagnosis and treatment to the provider
and trust her to act in the patient’s interest [1,2]. The ad-
vent of the internet as an alternative source of information
and the rise of an agenda of “patient-centered” care have
not diminished the centrality of this relationship – indeed,
these forces have arguably reinforced its importance while
subjecting it to new demands and stresses.
Like any agency relationship, the physician-patient
connection is subject to inherent conflicts of interest,
since it is bound up with the physician’s source of liveli-
hood. Much of health care policy can be understood as a
quest by the state to control these conflicts, and to har-
ness the power of the relationship to public objectives.
Initially, the objectives were to ensure that individual
physicians had the appropriate knowledge and expertise
to make diagnostic and treatment decisions, and that
they exercised that knowledge in accordance with pro-
fessional standards of behaviour. These judgments, how-
ever, required assessors who were themselves grounded
in the professional knowledge base. In theory, the stateCorrespondence: c.tuohy@utoronto.ca
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orcould have employed physicians to perform this func-
tion. But in most advanced nations, the state chose in-
stead to tap the expertise and professional credibility of
pre-existing professional networks by delegating author-
ity to professional bodies to regulate their members on
behalf of the state - establishing what was in effect a
“second-level” agency relationship a.
Distinguishing between this agency role for profes-
sional bodies on the one hand, and the right of profes-
sionals to engage in collective action in their own
interests (including pecuniary interests) on the other,
has always presented an institutional challenge. The ad-
vent of third-party payment, either public or private, as
the norm in most health care systems in the twentieth
century sharpened this challenge by requiring physicians
to engage in various forms of collective bargaining with
payers.
In an illuminating review, Borow, Levi and Glekin [3]
show how different national systems vary in the degree
to which they insist on institutionally insulating the
agency function from the promotion of private profes-
sional interests. They relate these national differences to
the models of governance and finance that characterize
the health care systems more broadly, using categories
first developed by Moran [4]. Avatars of two models -
one in which the market provides the centre of gravity
for the health care system (the United States) and thehis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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based model (the United Kingdom) have each come to
insist on a greater institutional separation of the agency
role from the representation of private interest than have
“corporatist” nations, with their more collaborative oper-
ating principles, as represented by Germany. “Hybrid” sys-
tems such as those of the Netherlands and Israel fall
between these extremes, allowing professional associations
charged with pursuing the private interests of their mem-
bers to have some role in regulatory decision-making,
though not as extensive a role as in the German case.
This characterization is useful in drawing attention to
variation in the norms, both formal and informal, that
govern the operation of the agency relationship between
the medical professional and the state in advanced na-
tions, and in relating this variation to broader health sys-
tem characteristics and to historical factors. In this brief
commentary I can offer only a few glosses on this contri-
bution and its implications for the further development
of public policy in this area.
First, the portraits of the American and British systems
need some shading. The authors somewhat overstate the
exclusion of medical associations from regulatory decision-
making in the United States, by portraying the state med-
ical boards (the licensing bodies) as “independent agencies”
appointed by the governor. While technically correct, this
portrayal neglects the fact that the history of the develop-
ment of the licensing boards is one of progressive disen-
tanglement from state medical societies – a process that
varied considerably across states and remains incomplete.
In about 20 states the state medical societies (federated
within the American Medical Association, or AMA) con-
tinue to advise on or nominate members for appointment
to the medical boards. As noted in the text of the Borow
et al. article (though not in the summary table), moreover,
the AMA is also involved in the establishment of the
boards which accredit specialist physicians.
In the UK, the institutional insulation of the licensing
and disciplinary function from the representation of pro-
fessional interests is more fully realized. But this fact
should not obscure the other avenues through which
professional influence over licensing and discipline is
exercised. The General Medical Council was dominated
by representatives of professional societies and academic
institutions (though not the British Medical Association)
from its founding in 1898 until the 1970s, and only in
the 2000s was a principle of equal representation of lay
and medical members established.
My second observation concerns the need to look be-
yond the health care system to the broader political
economy to explain the national differences mapped by
Borow, Levi and Glekin. The nations they review can be
seen as representing different “varieties of capitalism
(VOC):” the US and the UK fall into the domainof “liberal market economies” (LMEs) characterized
by competition and arm’s-length relationships, while
Germany and the Netherlands are closer to a “coordi-
nated market economy” (CME) model based on net-
works and collaboration [5]. (In the VOC literature,
Israel has been assigned to the liberal market economy
type [6]). Within these broad groupings, moreover, there
are further variations: the British style of regulation has
historically been more informal and flexible than that of
the US [7]; and no aspect of Dutch public policy can be
understood without recognizing the long-standing and
pervasive tension between the cultural values of “solida-
rity” and “subsidiarity” [8]. Hence the distinctive national
variants of professional regulatory institutions described
by Borow et al. have deeper roots than a focus on the
structure of the “health care state” alone would suggest.
If anything, the need to tap professional expertise
through agency relationships may have tempered these
differences in the health care arena.
The key insight from the VOC literature, however, is
that neither the “liberal” or the “coordinated” model of
politico-economic organization is inherently more effi-
cient than the other. Rather, what matters is the internal
coherence or logic of these systems that conditions the
expectations of actors in responding to particular chal-
lenges b. In the arena of professional regulation, it is
conceivable that public objectives could be served either
by a strict formal separation of roles or by an acknow-
ledgement and appropriate weighting of these different
interests within trust-based networks. It is, in fact, an
empirical question as to the conditions under which
each model is likely to be effective. There appears, for
example, to be no relationship between the regulatory
model and the income of physicians: the US, the
Netherlands and Germany stand out internationally for
the high relative incomes of both GPs and specialists.
An ambitious attempt by OECD researchers to assess
the “efficiency” c of health care systems, moreover, ranks
the Netherlands and Germany well ahead of the UK and
the US, although well below other “liberal” nations such
as Australia (which also place regulators at greater dis-
tance from the interest-based medical association) [9].
This is a field ripe for further inquiry, and Borow, Levi
and Glekin have paved the way.
Endnotes
aThis is essentially an academic interpretation of the
relationship. However, a similar interpretation is offered
in the 1975 report of the Merrison Committee regarding
the British General Medical Council (GMC), a body
most of whose membership until then was chosen by
various medical constituencies. “We have suggested that
the regulation of the profession can be looked upon as a
contract made between the public and the profession. It
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http://www.ijhpr.org/content/2/1/10is important to understand in this context that the GMC
is merely the instrument for the proper supervision of
this contract and that it derives its authority, and indeed
its being, from legislation” [10]. Moran [4] also draws at-
tention to this passage.
bThere is extensive debate about the definition and the
implications of “institutional complementarity” in this
regard [11].
cTheir measure of efficiency relates health care ex-
penditure to the distance between actual life expectancy
at birth and that which would be expected on the basis
of various social and economic factors.
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